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Resource Movement and the Legal System 
Herbert Hovenkamp
*
 
Introduction 
 
 In The Problem of Social Cost Ronald Coase identified transaction 
costs as the main impediment to the free and efficient flow of resources.  
Transaction costs were what made a legal system important to private 
ordering.  Coase wrote about several common law disputes among 
neighbors whose economic activities conflicted with one another.
1
  One of 
them was Sturges v. Bridgman, the nineteenth century British nuisance case 
between the two occupants of a duplex building sharing a party wall.
2
  
Octavius Sturges was a prominent London pediatrician who specialized in 
childrens' respiratory diseases, such as pneumonia. Frederick Horatio 
Bridgman was a prominent confectioner to Queen Victoria, whose process 
for making sweets required him to use a mechanical mortar & pestle to 
pulverize substances such as chocolate.
3
  The nuisance dispute arose when 
Sturges complained that Bridgman's machine, with its repetitive pounding, 
made it impossible for Sturges to use his stethoscope to diagnose his 
patients. 
 Coase argued that if high transaction costs did not interfere, private 
bargaining would provide a solution to the problem of conflicting uses 
which he characterized as efficient -- namely, the right to continue would be 
given to the person who valued it most.
 4
  For example, if the pediatrician 
valued the right to relative silence at £100, while the confectioner valued 
the right to conduct his business at £60, the efficient solution would 
preserve the pediatrician's £100 value over the confectioner's £60 value. 
 Alternative solutions might preserve the ability of both parties to 
operate, however, generating a social value of £160.  Coase did not consider 
these, because the tiny market he focused on was too small to include them.  
His was concerned with transaction costs, and on his assumptions the only 
parties who could transact were Sturges and Bridgman, and only with each 
other.  This tiny microcosm was a market because Sturges and Bridgman 
were locked together by virtue of their own previous investments. 
                                                 
*
 Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of 
Iowa. 
1
 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1960).  
2
Sturges vs. Bridgman, LR 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879). 
3
For more on the players and the facts, see A.W.B. Simpson, Coase v. 
Pigou Reexamined, 25 J.LEGAL STUD. 53 (1996). 
4
Coase, Social Cost, supra note __ at 16 
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 But transaction costs are only a portion of the costs of locating the 
best place for resources.  Considering all relevant costs usually requires us 
to focus on larger markets and longer time periods than the micromarkets 
that inhabit Coase.  This has occurred in the law and economics of 
automobile accidents, where assumptions about the high costs of bargaining 
have turned attention to the overall markets where automobiles operate 
rather than individual pairwise conflicts.
5
  When we refocus our attention in 
this way, the results that Coase described as efficient are frequently 
suboptimal. 
Further, one important source of cost savings is determining where 
resources should be assigned initially, thus limiting the occasions and costs 
for further movement.  These costs are higher as initial resource investment 
is less coordinated, more costly, and more specialized as to activity and 
location.  Further, determining the initial location of resources invariably 
requires us to consider the interests of larger numbers of players, 
encompassing the entire market in which resources move around.  Markets 
like those envisioned in The Problem of Social Cost, which move resources 
only by unanimous consent, work more poorly as the number of participants 
increases.
6
  Coase himself realized that in such cases government 
intervention may be preferable even for relatively simple conflicts 
traditionally analyzed under the common law of nuisance or trespass. 
 
The Costs of Movement 
 Moving things from one place to another is costly.  I may have a 
second television that would be of better use in my son's apartment, because 
he has none.  If he values it there more than I value it here, moving it might 
be a good idea.  But I live in Iowa City while he is in New York.  Moving 
the television to New York might cost $150, and he could buy a good used 
one or perhaps a small new one in New York for less.  In that case moving 
the television actually decreases net value even though he values my 
television by more than I do. 
 Most people spend substantial time considering the costs of moving 
resources around, such as when we decide where to live in relation to work, 
where to go on vacation, where to shop and how to organize a multistore 
trip, or whether to shop in person or online.   The best course of action is 
usually to get our plan right the first time, for fixing it later costs more. 
 A great deal of classical and neoclassical economics paid 
surprisingly little attention to the idea that the movement of resources is 
                                                 
5
 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
6
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costly.
7
  In economic models resources often move without friction from 
lower value to higher value positions until the economy is in equilibrium, or 
a steady state in which no further gains from resource movement are 
possible.  Cambridge economist Arthur Cecil Pigou, writing in the 1920s 
and 1930s, was deeply concerned about the costs of moving resources,
8
 but 
prior to the time of Coase he was somewhat exceptional. 
 Coase's work turned people's attention to "transaction costs," 
particularly to Coase's theory that transaction costs are what account for the 
legal system.  Transaction costs are only a subset of the costs of moving 
resources, however, and often are a fairly small subset.   If  I loaded my TV 
into my van and drove it to New York, getting it there would be costly.  
These would not be "transaction costs," however, except for those involving 
the gasoline, tolls, and perhaps a motel room that I purchase along the way.  
Indeed, Coase argued in his well known 1937 article on "The Nature of the 
Firm" that minimization of all kinds of costs, including transaction costs, 
determines which things a firm will do for itself internally and which it will 
purchase on a market.
9
  For example, cleaning the office windows could be 
done by the firm's own employees or else by contracting with a window 
washing service.  When it makes this decision the firm really does not care 
that one of these is a "transaction" cost while the other is not.  The only 
thing that really matters is which costs less. 
 The term "transaction costs"  is overused in law and economics.  In 
particular, it should not describe costs that have nothing to do with 
transactions.  For me to wash my own windows is costly, but using my own 
labor is not a transaction cost.  Often nontransaction costs are wrapped up 
                                                 
7
See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC 
HISTORY 5 (1981), who complained that the neoclassical approach avoided 
"all of the interesting questions,' because 
The world with which it is concerned is a frictionless one in 
which institutions do not exist and all change occurs through 
perfectly operating markets. In short, the costs of acquiring 
information, uncertainty, and transactions costs do not exist. 
SEE ALSO MARTIN HOLLIS AND EDWARD NELL, RATIONAL ECONOMIC MAN: 
A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 233 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 1975); Charles K. Rowley, "Rent-
Seeking Versus Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities" 18, in  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS (Charles K. 
Rowley, Robert D. Tollison, Gordon Tullock, eds. 1988). 
8
 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
9
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 
(1937). 
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into a bargain in such a way that the entire bargain looks like transaction 
costs.  For example, if I am an apple grower selling to a buyer 50 miles 
away, they will need to be shipped.  Shipping could clearly be part of our 
negotiated transaction.  Shipping in this case is not a "transaction" cost, 
however, but rather a cost of resource movement.  If I grew my apples in 
one place and owned a fruit stand 50 miles away I would still have to ship 
them, even though no transactions are necessarily involved.  I might load 
them onto my own truck and drive them to the fruit stand myself.  Whether 
or not I "transact," the apples must still be moved. 
 For Pigou, "transaction costs" were only a subset of the "costs of 
movement," or of getting resources from one place to another.
10
  
Nevertheless, his conclusions were the same that Coase would come to later 
about transaction costs.  Coase observed that if the costs of making a 
transaction were greater than the increase in value that resulted from 
transfer of a legal entitlement to a higher value position, then the transaction 
would not occur.  He began with the traditional economic observation that 
resources under free choice move from lower to higher value uses.  But then 
he added the important qualifier that this "assumed costless market 
transactions."  Further, 
Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into 
account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be 
undertaken when the increase in the value of production consequent 
upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs which would be 
involved in bringing it about.  When it is less, the granting of an 
injunction (or the knowledge that it would be granted) or the liability 
to pay damages may result in an activity being discontinued (or may 
prevent its being started) which would be undertaken if market 
transactions were costless. In these conditions the initial delimitation 
of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the 
economic system operates.  One arrangement of rights may bring 
                                                 
10
 ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE,  pt. II, ch. III, 
§3 (4th ed. 1932).  See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and 
Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 633 (2009); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (2012); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and 
Economics, 86 IND.L.J. 499, 504 (2011).  Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, The 
Problem of Resource Access , 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1483-93 (2013) 
(using the term "resource allocation costs"); Harold Demsetz, The Problem 
of Social Cost: What Problem? A Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. Pigou 
and R.H. Coase, 7 REV. L. & ECON. 1, 7 (2011) (acknowledging the 
differences between transaction and other resource movement costs). 
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about a greater value of production than any other. But unless this is 
the arrangement of rights established by the legal system, the costs 
of reaching the same result by altering and combining rights through 
the market may be so great that this optimal arrangement of rights, 
and the greater value of production which it would bring, may never 
be achieved.
11
 
 Pigou had made exactly the same point, but he spoke more globally 
of the "costs of movement," which encompassed all the costs of getting a 
resource from one use to another: 
Suppose that between two points A and B the movement of a 
unit of resources can be effected at a capital cost equivalent to an 
annual charge of n shillings for every year during which a unit that 
is moved continues in productive work in its new home. In these 
circumstances the national dividend will be increased by the 
movement of resources from A to B, so long as the annual value of 
the marginal social net product at B exceeds that at A by more than 
n shillings....
12
 
 Many of the things that Pigou included as costs of movement were 
ones that Coase later characterized as transaction costs.
13
  In addition, 
however, were many other costs, including lack of information, education,
14
 
transportation,
15
 and commuting distances and times for workers.
16
  He also 
observed that reducing these costs of movement enabled a division of labor, 
resulting in cheaper or better quality goods.
17
  Pigou noted that machine 
production reduced the demand for skilled labor, and that unskilled laborers 
could generally be redeployed at lower cost than skilled workers.  This 
                                                 
11
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15-16 
(1960). See also Coase's Nobel Prize lecture. Ronald H. Coase, The 
Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1992). 
12
PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, Pt. II, ch. III, §3 at 138. 
13
E.g., id. at  Id. pt. II, ch. VII, § 1, at 158: 
[P]ayments that have to be made to various agents in the capital 
market, promoters, financing syndicates, investment trusts, 
solicitors, bankers, and others, who, in varying degrees according to 
the nature of the investment concerned, help in the work of 
transporting capital from its places of origin to its places of 
employment. 
14
Id. at pt. II, Ch. 6 ("Hindrance to the Equality of Returns Due to 
Imperfect Knowledge"_) 
15
Id. Part II, Ch. 17, and Ch. 18 on the effect of railroad rate structures. 
16
Part III, Ch. 9, §10. 
17
Id., Part III., Ch. 9, 10. 
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enabled workers to be shifted more cheaply as product needs changed.
18
 
 
Relative Deadweight Loss 
 The costs of movement in general, or transaction costs in particular, 
are sometimes described as an economic deadweight loss.
19
  But that 
conclusion is meaningless unless we ask "compared to what?"  For 
example, we speak of the deadweight loss of monopoly only by comparing 
it to a competitive economy, or else to some alternative market thought to 
be more competitive.
20
  If the norm is a frictionless economy in which 
everything moves costlessly from one use to another, then any cost of 
movement is a deadweight loss.  But no one lives in such an economy.  A 
more useful definition is that a cost of moving a resource is a deadweight 
loss to the extent that it is more costly than equally good and available 
alternatives.  Ceteris paribus, going from more to less costly means of 
moving resources will generally produce gains that exceed any losses, 
provided that nonparties are not adversely affected.  An important corollary 
is that a search for greater efficiency, assuming that is our goal, requires us 
continuously to seek out lower costs of moving resources around. 
 
The Choice of an Initial Position 
 Another important corollary, stressed by Pigou and later Calabresi 
but not by Coase, is that it is often efficient to ensure that resources are 
initially placed in their highest value use, making further movement 
unnecessary.
21
  For example, Pigou was particularly concerned about the 
extent to which workers were often initially assigned to low value 
occupations, largely because of family tradition or lack of education.
22
 
                                                 
18
Ibid. 
19
Ronald J. Colombo, The Role of Trust in Financial Regulation, 55 
VILL.L.REV. 577, 579 (2010); Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of 
Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1635, 1683-84 (2006); Frieder Frasch, Transaction Costs 
of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in German Companies, 7 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 48 (2007). 
20
See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE 
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §1.3 (4th ed. 2011). 
21
See PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, Pt. II, ch. 3, §3. 
22
 Id., Pt. III, Ch. 9, §§5-7: 
The most fundamental way in which the first of these causes, 
ignorance, operates is by impairing the initial distribution of new 
generations of workpeople as they flow into industry.  Those 
persons who direct the choice of avocations made by young men and 
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 Coasean efficiency is undermined by externalities whose costs 
cannot be internalized because transaction costs are too high.  For example, 
the noise of Bridgman's machine is a resource conflict the parties will have 
to resolve by bargaining.  If the legal system assigns the right to the wrong 
person, high transaction costs may prevent it from being transferred to the 
correct one.  For an individual making a resource choice, the cost of a bad 
initial decision can be an negative externality if it does not fall upon the 
person who made it but the cost of movement away from the initial position 
are high. 
To illustrate, suppose that upon entering the confection trade Bridgman 
could have chosen between two equally suitable buildings that cost the 
same.  He chose the one that later created the conflict with Sturges.  The 
other building would be occupied by a different noise making business that 
was not bothered by Bridgman's mortar & pestle.  At this point relocating to 
the alternative place would cost £25, but initially it would have cost 
Bridgman the same amount to move into either location.  That lost £25 
shows up now to the extent that reciprocal bargaining obliges either 
Bridgman or Sturges to pay it, depending on how the law assign's liability.  
For example, if the law finds against Sturges, holding that there is no 
nuisance, then Sturges must pay Bridgman at least £25 to get him to move.  
On the other hand, if Bridgman had moved into the correct place to begin 
with, neither would have to pay and society would be £25 richer. 
 The law and economics of traffic accidents takes a very different 
approach to this problem. It considers the full market in which automobiles 
operate rather than the relationship between two automobiles approaching 
each other.
23
  For example, the nationwide American rules requiring driving 
on the right side of the road, or that automobiles must yield to trains at 
grade crossings, ensure that operators do not have to engage in pairwise 
bargaining later.  These are basically "zoning" rules for the road, which rely 
on conventions or cost avoidance as a surrogate for bargaining.  Their goal 
is to get people into the right place from the beginning, so that subsequent 
                                                                                                                            
women entering industry are ignorant both of the level at which the 
demand price for any given quantity of labour of any given grade 
will stand in different occupations at a later period of those young 
persons' lives, and also of what the quantity of labour offering itself 
in those different occupations at that period will be. 
On the problem today, see Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin, "Improving 
Efficiency in School Choice," 170-188, in THE HANDBOOK OF MARKET 
DESIGN (Nir Vulkan, et al., eds. 2013). 
23
Mainly in GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL 
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).  See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
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bargaining will not be necessary.  The premise for state enforced traffic 
rules is that greater government intervention is needed because individual 
bargaining is less likely to be effective.  When all the relevant costs of land 
use externalities are considered, however, including the cost of not being in 
the right place from the beginning, the differences between traffic rules and 
zoning rules become relatively insignificant. 
 
Coasean Markets 
 Ronald Coase's name is widely associated with the role of 
transaction costs in the economy, and their relationship to the legal system.  
Those who have peered into Coase have seen a variety of things, many of 
which Coase himself did not see or would have rejected.  But the markets 
that are central to the functioning of the legal system in Coase's analysis 
have some distinctive features.  One is Coase's quite narrow conception of 
"efficiency."
24
 A second is that Coasean markets are very small.  How small 
they are is determined by the costs of movement, both transactional and 
nontransactional, from a given starting position.
25
  A third feature of 
Coasean markets is that moving resources within them requires unanimous 
agreement of the relevant participants.  As Coase himself acknowledged 
more than once, this fact has important implications for the efficacy of 
bargained solutions as the number of bargainers increases.
26
 
 
Identifying the "Efficient" Outcome 
 Traditional markets typically have large numbers of buyers and 
sellers, but a single buyer and a single seller are sufficient to make a trade.  
For example, if I buy a loaf of bread in a competitive market from my 
grocer, both the grocer and I are better off.  The market for bread contains 
many other buyers and sellers who did not participate in this transaction.  
They are largely indifferent to my particular deal, except to the extent that 
one or more of them had been competing for my trade, or that I took the last 
loaf on the shelf.  In some cases others will use information about my trade 
to inform their own choices.  They will go on to make their trades with 
others.  While a particular transaction occurs at the "micro" level, the 
overall market could be very large, perhaps even nationwide or worldwide. 
 These traditional markets are not the ones contemplated in The 
Problem of Social Cost.  There, the trade and the market are the same size.
27
  
Think back to Sturges v. Bridgman, which Coase used to illustrate how 
                                                 
24
See discussion infra, text at notes ___. 
25
See discussion infra, text at notes ___. 
26
See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
27
See discussion infra, text at notes ___. 
Hovenkamp Resource Movement and Legal System Oct. 2013, 9 
private bargaining could resolve the dispute without the intervention of the 
legal system.  Rather than thinking of one party as a victim of a 
wrongdoer’s negative externality, Coase argued, we should treat each as 
having a tradeable property interest that conflicts with the interest of the 
other.  They are like two people vying to park their cars in the same spot.  
Assuming that they bargain, the winner will be the person who places the 
higher value on the right.  Suppose Sturges values the right to be free of the 
noise by £100, while Bridgman values the right to use his noisy machine by 
£60.  Suppose also that the law said Sturges would lose his lawsuit because 
the noise from the mortar & pestle is not sufficient to constitute a nuisance.  
In that case Sturges would pay Bridgman a sum between £60 and £100, 
Bridgman would shut down the machine, and both parties would be better 
off.  For example, if Sturges paid Bridgman  £75, Bridgman would be  £15 
better off and Sturges would be £25 better off..  Suppose, however, that the 
law of London provided that the machine was a nuisance, entitling Sturges 
to an injunction shutting it down.  Bridgman might wish to settle with a 
money payment, but the most he would pay is £60 and the least Sturges 
would accept is £100.  No settlement would occur and the injunction would 
shut the machine down. 
 This story illustrates both the "invariance" corollary and the 
"efficiency" corollary of the Coase Theorem.
28
  The invariance corollary is 
somewhat counterintuitive and its domain has been controversial.
29
  The 
decision whether Bridgman's mortar & pestle continues to operate is not 
determined by whether it is an unlawful nuisance, but rather by the 
respective values that the two parties place on the right in question.  In its 
strongest form, the theorem states that in the absence of transaction costs 
common law rules have nothing whatsoever to do with how resources are 
allocated, although they may force some money to change hands.  In the 
nuisance jurisdiction the mortar & pestle is shut down and neither party 
pays anything to the other.  In the no-nuisance jurisdiction the mortar & 
                                                 
28
 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 100-104 (2004). 
29
 For example, under declining marginal utility or an "endowment 
"effect, it may not hold true, at least not for human actors or firms that are 
not risk neutral.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment 
Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1991); Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal 
Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783 (1990); Daniel 
Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the 
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990).  See also Russell Korobkin, 
The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1228 
(2003). 
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pestle is also shut down, but this time physician Sturges pays Bridgman a 
settlement payment between £60 and £100.  In order for the invariance 
thesis to apply the rights in question have to be "alienable," which means 
that they can be traded through private settlement of a lawsuit.  Common 
law rights are generally alienable in this fashion.  However, most statutory 
rights or public regulations are not.  For example, if a zoning ordinance 
forbad operation of noisy machinery in this neighborhood, the parties would 
not be able to negotiate to the efficient settlement because a neighbor 
typically has no right to "waive" his neighbor's obligations under the zoning 
statute. 
 The efficiency corollary of the Coase theorem states that in a well 
functioning market the outcome will be "efficient," which means that it 
maximizes the wealth of the two parties, and thus social wealth assuming 
that no one else is affected.  The Coasean bargain assigns the disputed 
interest to the person who values it most highly.  In the given example, the 
physician's right to be free of the noise is worth £100, while the 
confectioner's right to create the noise is worth only £60.  Forcibly granting 
the right to the confectioner would destroy £100 in resources in favor of a 
value of only £60.  Thus the "efficient" outcome is defined as the one that 
produces the £100 right. 
 Describing this as the "efficient" outcome is idiosyncratic, however, 
in one important sense.  Again, we must ask "compared to what?"  Clearly 
an even more efficient outcome would be one in which both Sturges and 
Bridgman could conduct their business without interference from the other.  
This would generate total value of £160.  Coase did not consider this a 
viable alternative because he took the location of Sturges and Bridgman in 
the same building as a given. 
 
Micromarkets, Resource Movement, and Efficiency 
 Coasean thinking focused economic analysis of law on 
"micromarkets," or situations involving very small groups of traders who 
are locked together by some preexisting commitment, whether it be tenancy 
in a duplex, neighbors in a subdivision, automobiles speeding toward one 
another, an unhappy marriage, or disputes between shareholders and 
managers in a single corporation.
30
 
 One problem with these Coasean markets is that they are rarely very 
competitive.  Sturges and Bridgman have only each other to bargain with, 
and bilateral monopolies of this sort often lead to difficulty in reaching 
                                                 
30
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2010) 
at Ch. 5 (family law), ch. 6 (torts), Ch. 14 (Corporations and other business 
organizations); Ch. 15 (financial markets). 
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outcomes.  One problems with bilateral monopolies is that they increase 
transaction costs because there is no competition to discipline each person's 
ask or offer prices.  Joint maximization may be frustrated by each person's 
incentive to hide information from the other.
31
  These problems are 
exacerbated as Coasean markets more actors because unanimity is a 
precondition to trading.  Such markets are not strictly speaking "bilateral" 
monopolies.  Nevertheless, they have all the efficiency challenging 
characteristics of bilateral monopolies, often magnified.
32
  
 London in 1879 undoubtedly had hundreds of physicians, hundreds 
of confectioners, and thousands of duplexes or other buildings suitable for 
business.  Ordinarily we would think of these things when talking about 
markets.  Physicians compete with each other, as do confectioners and 
landlords.  But the "market" at issue in Coase's article was a peculiar one, 
limited to a single physician, a single confectioner and a single building. 
 What makes this relationship between solitary Sturges and solitary 
Bridgman a "market"?  The answer is that prior commitments plus the costs 
of movement define this market's boundaries.  Sturges and Bridgman are 
stuck together by virtue of a previous investment each of them had made in 
the same building.
33
  For example, suppose as before that Sturges valued the 
right to be free of Bridgman's noise at £100, while Bridgeman valued the 
right to make it at £60.  But suppose that for £35 Bridgman could move to 
an equally good location with no noise or other conflict and no harm to his 
business.  No matter how liability was assigned, Bridgman would move.  In 
a nuisance jurisdiction he would move rather than shut down.  In a no 
                                                 
31
See Roger D. Blair, David L. Kaserman, & Richard E. Romano, A 
Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral Monopoly, 55 S.ECON. J. 831 (1989).  
On bilateral monopoly and the Coase Theorem, see Robert Cooter, The Cost 
of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982).  Among the earliest observations of 
indeterminacy in strictly bilateral trading is F.Y. EDGEWORTH, 
MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION OF 
MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 29-33 (1881); Fritz Machlup & 
Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical 
Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 101 (1960). 
32
 See discussion infra, text at notes ___. 
33
 Cf. "lock in' as a theory justifying very small markets in antitrust 
cases.  For example, those who already own a Kodak photocopier are 
locked in to an ongoing supply of service and repair parts, thus making 
"Kodak parts" or "Kodak service" a relevant market as to them.  See 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 458-459 
(1992) (accepting this theory), critiqued in 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
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nuisance jurisdiction Sturges would pay him to move, which would require 
less than paying him to shut down.  If Bridgman had moved to a location 
with less conflict to begin with, however, his moving costs would be zero. 
 Coase had actually recognized this in 1937, in The Nature of the 
Firm.  A profit-maximizing firm would compare the cost of operating in its 
current location against the cost of moving elsewhere, and choose the value 
maximizing solution.
34
  The message of Coase's 1937 article is that when 
we consider the problem of Sturges and Bridgman, focusing exclusively on 
transaction costs and on the micromarket that their dispute created can lead 
us astray.  Rather, we should consider all of the costs of moving resources, 
including transaction costs, as well as the full range of places and times 
where movement can occur.  The differences can be important.  Coase's 
approach in The Nature of the Firm compared the cost of transacting against 
the cost of getting something done by any other means, not limited to 
transactions.  A value maximizing firm would do exactly that.  For those 
purposes, the cost of redeploying resources initially invested badly would 
also be a cost.  The cheapest cost avoider gets it right the first time. 
 By focusing exclusively on transaction costs from a position defined 
by previous investment, Coasean thinking shifted our attention to 
micromarkets.  In each case, however, the situation creates a market 
because a previous choice (whether cooperative or unilateral) binds the two 
actors together and extraction is costly.  Sturges and Bridgman had a 
conflict because they were already established in their locations. If the costs 
of movement were sufficiently low, however, the optimal outcome could be 
for one of the parties simply to move away.  But suppose that we had been 
able to steer one of them to a different location to begin with, a policy that 
Pigou advocated strenuously.
35
  In that case the cost of movement could 
have been even lower, certainly less than the cost of moving to one address 
and then relocating to another.  This observation is relevant to many of 
Coase's examples.  The truly efficient solution to Sturges v. Bridgman is the 
one that permits each of them to operate without interference by the other.  
Further, the most efficient version of that choice is likely to be one that 
defines their property interests in such a way that they never become 
neighbors in the first place. 
 In an example that Coase used frequently, once a polluting 
smokestack and a residential neighborhood are constructed and in place, 
bargaining assigns the right to the highest value set of participants.
36
  But an 
even higher value could obtain if a zoning law forbad smokestacks and 
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Coase, Nature of the Firm, note ___. 
35
See discussion supra, text at notes ___. 
36
Coase, Problem of Social Cost, note __ at 1-2, 11-13. 
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homes from locating in close proximity to begin with -- or perhaps if the 
parties had the foresight to see into the future and bargain about location 
before making any initial investment.  The Coasean reasoning forces us to 
think of the "market" as the relationship between neighbors whose uses are 
already in place, in the process ignoring a larger market that presented a 
greater array of choices. 
 In his writing about automobile accidents, Guido Calabresi took a 
fundamentally different approach.  In one of the first articles to cite "The 
Problem of Social Cost" Walter Blum and Harry Kalven from the 
University of Chicago had noted the importance of Coase's work in 
assessing resource conflict.  They concluded that it could not be applied to 
automobile accidents, however.  In traffic collision cases people do not 
know in advance who their bargaining opposites are until it is too late, and 
there are significant other limitations to their ability to bargain over such 
issues as the right of way.
37
  Calabresi responded that the way to think about 
the problem is to imagine who would have won the bargain in a regime in 
which bargaining had been possible.  Under bargaining in a well 
functioning market, the person who ends up taking the precaution is the one 
in a position to avoid the accident at the lowest cost.  Thus the "cheapest 
cost avoider" entered the lexicon of law and economics.
38
 
 While Calabresi was responding to a problem of extremely high 
transaction costs, his solution to the traffic accident problem is not about 
transaction costs at all, but about the generally nontransactional costs of 
movement.  For example, consider the common law rule that at grade level 
railroad crossings trains have the right of way over cars.  The rationale is 
fairly simple: it costs a great deal more to stop and restart a train than to 
stop and restart a car.  If the train would incur costs of $2.00 while the car 
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Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a 
Private Law Problem -- Auto Compensation Plans, 31 UNIV. CHI.L.REV. 
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transacting.  See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation 
and Liability Rules -- A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 (1968).  Coase 
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would incur costs of 20 cents, then the parties would bargain for an 
outcome in which the train would have the right of way.  If payment were 
necessary, the amount would be somewhere between 20 cents and $2.00. 
 But while this problem can be recast as one in transaction costs, it is 
not really a transaction cost problem at all, but a problem related to the 
mechanical and energy costs of stopping and restarting heavier vs. lighter 
vehicles.  Indeed, the fact that the problem relates to engineering or 
mechanical costs rather than bargaining costs is what permits us to 
generalize across the full range of similar conflicts. Thinking of the problem 
as one in bargaining is an interesting metaphor, but it does not add anything 
to the solution.  It indicates only the truism that the costs of movement that 
require a bargain are always at least as great as the costs of movement 
alone.  If we required a transaction, then the higher total costs of reaching 
the right result would make the good outcome less certain, but that is only 
because we have added the complexity of a completely unnecessary 
bargain.  Or to say this differently, in the railroad/automobile grade crossing 
situation the correct rule is determined by assessing the cost of moving 
resources, and imagining a hypothetical bargain adds only an unnecessary 
complication. 
Neither can this problem be reduced to one about the correct assignment 
of default rules.  Default provisions are critical in situations where the 
parties must bargain but high transaction costs or an endowment effect 
obstructs trading to a higher value.  In that case it makes sense to assign the 
default in favor of the person who would end up with the right.
39
  In other 
situations, such as most of those involving traffic rules or zoning 
restrictions, the legal entitlements are inalienable, and thus they stay with 
the person to whom they are originally assigned. 
On the other hand, a type of default rule can also apply to a 
government's decision about how to allocate resources when initial 
decisions might be erroneous.  For example, the variance system in zoning 
ordinances creates a limited default rule with a relatively high burden.  
Zoning might separate industrial from residential uses but then give 
individual owners relief from provable mistakes that render the 
government's initial decision suboptimal.
40
  In general, the legal system's 
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 See Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and Coase Theorem, supra note 
__; Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U.L.REV. 106, 
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 E.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) 
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provision of constitutional or legislative challenges to government decisions 
that would otherwise create inalienable rights or burdens operate as default 
rules. 
 One important difference between transaction costs and non-
transactional costs of movement is that the latter typically relate to 
engineering, transportation, or sometimes social convention (such as driving 
on the right side of the road).  These are all processes that are capable of 
evaluation by outsider observers.  By contrast, transaction costs depend on 
willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept -- numbers that are subjective 
and much more difficult to observe, particularly if we are talking about 
natural persons rather than business firms.  When we think about good 
traffic rules, casting the problem in terms of one person's willingness-to-pay 
and another's willingness-to-accept simply misses the important point and 
overly subjectifies what is fundamentally a problem in risk management.  
For example, a civil engineer's observations about appropriate rules for 
trains and cars at grade crossings gives us much better and more useful 
information than any notion about the states of mind or the bargaining 
strategies of the operators. 
 Nontransactional costs of movement can more easily be predicted 
across categories of persons or technologies when our thinking is not 
complicated by the need to consider hypothetical bargains. Actual 
bargaining can involve us with noneconomic values or behavioral issues 
that often serve to interfere with efficient bargaining outcomes.
41
  It can also 
be subject to disguising of information or strategic behavior.
42
  Coase 
ignored these issues, even as he insisted that the problem be cast as one of 
bargaining.  A much more direct route to the same result is to ignore 
bargaining altogether in situations where bargaining is unnecessary or 
bargaining metaphors unhelpful.  If what we really mean by efficient 
outcomes is competitive market value, a social concept based on observed 
costs, then assuming a bargain only gets in the way. 
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The Role of Liberty of Contract 
 When we think of legal conflicts in terms of the cost of moving 
resources rather than simply the costs of bargaining, the link between 
liberty of contract as an ideology and outcomes in the legal system becomes 
weaker.  This is not to say that bargaining or the right to bargain is not 
important.  In many situations the legal system does and should defer to 
parties' contractual judgments rather than the objectively defined costs of 
moving resources.  Buyers and sellers in competitive commercial markets 
make highly individual choices about who to transact with, what to buy, and 
how much to pay.  People who are of age have a right to select each other 
for marriage, even if friends believe that this particular resource movement 
is a bad idea and may lead to costly re-movement in the future. 
 But imagining bargains in situations where they are unnecessary, as 
the Coasean analysis sometimes does, may force us to identify particular 
solutions as desirable even though more satisfactory solutions are available.  
On the illustrative numbers given above, the "efficient" solution to Sturges 
v. Bridgman is for Bridgman to shut down his mortar & pestle, thus 
preserving Sturges' more valuable interest.  But this solution is efficient 
only because we are viewing it myopically, within the context of a 
micromarket that the parties' own prior decisions had created.  Once we 
look at the bigger market where the services of physicians and confectioners 
are sold, then solutions are likely to emerge in which both Sturges and 
Bridgman can continue to operate. 
This observation extends to a wide variety of circumstances, such as the 
proverbial smokestack industry and the downwind home owners.  Once the 
parties have invested in their position they become the relevant market for 
bargaining purposes, and the efficient solution will prefer one use over the 
others.  But earlier, before their positions have been established, a range of 
much more competitive solutions is available that can permit both uses to 
survive.  This helps to explain why more than a half century of Coasean 
analysis has not placed a noticeable dent in the prevalence of basic zoning 
rules that segregate polluting industry from residential uses.  When we think 
about the initial assignment in such settings, pairwise bargaining is not in 
the cards.  The relevant actors are not the established smokestack and the 
established home owner.  Rather, they are more like the random pair of 
automobiles driving in the same county, not yet aware that they may later 
be in a position of conflict. 
 When we examine the cost of traffic collisions and the cheapest way 
of avoiding them, the imaginary bargain that we use to identify who would 
have won the right of way is only a "bargain" in a loose metaphorical sense.  
Ultimately these questions reduce to ones of engineering, technical ability 
or superiority, or some other factor that has nothing to do with a bargain.  
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Deciding whether the train or the car should yield the right of way is 
fundamentally not a problem in bargaining.  Making it into one involves 
many behavioral and transactional complexities, while giving nothing in 
return. 
 Such solutions do limit property and contract rights to the extent that 
they forbid individuals from creating harmful externalities in the first place.  
Perhaps land occupants should have a property right or liberty of contract to 
invest in any activity and resolve externality issues later, perhaps by making 
a costly divestment.  It's more difficult to make an argument that automobile 
drivers should have a right to drive on whichever side of the road they 
please, bargaining to yield whenever traffic approaches.  Drivers don't own 
the roads and consent to traffic rules are a price of admission.  But that 
answer is unsatisfactory.  One characteristic of most externalities is that 
they have no respect for property lines, whether it is Bridgman's noise or the 
polluter's smoke.  Accepting the Coasean analysis, however, entails that we 
have already subordinated these liberty rights to concerns about efficiency. 
 
Many Player Coasean Markets 
 Making a trade requires at least two people but typically not more.  
In the traditional markets that have dominated classical and neoclassical 
economics, the number of people who make a trade is only a small subset of 
the market's total participants.  For example, the competitive market for 
bread contains thousands of buyers and sellers, but a trade requires only one 
of each, and the rest of the market is largely indifferent. 
 Coasean markets are different because trading requires an agreement 
of all market participants.  Even in the two person setting, such as Sturges 
and Bridgman, this market functions less well than a competitive market 
because it is a bilateral monopoly.  Each one can trade only with the other.
43
  
When Coasean markets have more than two participants, additional 
complications emerge.  No deal will be made unless all participants agree.  
As the number of bargainers necessary to make a trade increases and their 
individual interests are more diverse, reaching a bargain becomes much 
more difficult.
44
 
                                                 
43
See discussion supra, text at notes ___.  See also OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS 238-247 (1975) (on numerous difficulties of trading in less 
than competitive markets). 
44
 On the relevance of diversity to transaction costs, see Carol M. Rose, 
The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2184 (1997); Ian Ayres 
& Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to 
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995). 
Hovenkamp Resource Movement and Legal System Oct. 2013, 18 
 When three or more participants are involved, Coasean bargaining 
can yield cycling problems, although they are somewhat different from the 
cycling problems encountered in political (majority vote) markets.  In 
political markets a common problem is that any nonunanimous but initially 
winning coalition can be defeated by a different nonunanimous coalition, as 
developed in Condorcet's Paradox and later formalized by Arrow's 
Impossibility Theorem.
45
   As a result, purely democratic markets can be 
unstable unless the vote is unanimous.
46
 
 In the Coasean market an agreed upon solution is stable because it 
would take unanimous consent to change it.  The cycling problem shows up 
in reaching the decision in the first place.  Suppose a smokestack factory 
belches smoke that injures 100 home owners but is in a non-nuisance 
jurisdiction. The home owners must pay the smokestack  if they want to 
shut it down.  That payment will theoretically occur if the aggregate value 
that the home owners place on freedom from smoke is greater than the 
value that the factory places on continued operation.  But how will the 
payment be divided among the home owners?  A coalition of the most 
nearby home owners may agree on an equal payment for everyone, but 
more remote home owners will object that they are injured less by the 
smoke and thus place a lower value on its removal.  Or those who have 
property interests that are less valuable or less vulnerable to smoke damage 
will argue that payments should be proportioned to harm.  Or some home 
owners may object that the prevailing winds force the smoke into a path that 
injures some home owners more than others.  The result could be an endless 
set of proposals, coalitions and counterproposals, with no proposal ever 
achieving the unanimous consent that is needed.  The same thing could 
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happen in a nuisance jurisdiction where the value of operating the factory is 
greater than the injury to the home owners.  In that case the factory would 
be willing to compensate the home owners, but only after they agree on 
how the compensation should be divided.  The same problems emerge. 
 Even when unanimous consent is initially achieved, Coasean 
bargaining rules are suboptimal when they make it more difficult to account 
for changed circumstances.  Rules initially established by unanimous 
consent might later become inefficient.  If unanimous consent is required to 
change them, however, there will be holdouts that prevent the change from 
taking place.  That is, the Coasean market produces excessive stability. 
Some residential subdivisions whose uses are controlled by private 
servitudes have attempted to solve this problem by permitting 
nonunanimous voting to change an existing restriction that is no longer 
desirable.  But switching to nonunanimous rules simply substitutes one 
cycling problem for another.  The nonunanimous rules have all the defects 
of democratic voting systems generally.
47
 
 Coase himself recognized the problem of bargaining in markets with 
large numbers of players.  He was particularly concerned with smoke 
pollution, writing about it in both his 1959 article on the Federal 
Communications Commission and a year later in The Problem of Social 
Cost.  One can speculate that his interest resulted from his earlier life spent 
in heavily polluted London.  In The Federal Communications Commission, 
Coase observed that "when large numbers of people are involved, the 
argument for the institution of property rights is weakened and that for 
general regulations becomes stronger."  Speaking of smoke pollution in 
particular, he acknowledged that "if many people are harmed and there are 
several sources of pollution, it is more difficult to reach a satisfactory 
solution through the market."  As a result, "in these circumstances it may be 
preferable to impose special regulations...."
48
 
 In  The Problem of Social Cost a year later Coase returned to smoke 
pollution.
49
  Interestingly, his most extensive discussion was of Bryant v. 
Lefever, a dispute between a single defendant and a single plaintiff.  Coase 
himself acknowledged that the situation was "novel."  The nuisance dispute 
arose when the defendant rebuilt his house, giving it a higher roofline that 
prevented the plaintiff's chimney from clearing its smoke.
50
  Coase later 
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addressed  the "standard case of a smoke nuisance ...[that]  may affect a vast 
number of people engaged in a wide variety of activities."  Coase conceded 
that private bargaining might not be able to determine the result and that we 
might wish to call upon the "government" as a "super-firm" to use an 
"administrative decision" to solve the problem.
 51
 
 Coase also discussed the problem of railroad trains that throw sparks 
from their engines, sometimes causing fires on nearby land.
52
  The relevant 
cost to the individual land owners is the probability that a fire will occur on 
their property multiplied by the expected amount of damage.  The relevant 
cost to the railroads is the cost of minimizing the sparks, perhaps by 
proceeding more slowly or installing spark suppressing technology or 
switching fuels, or perhaps even by ceasing operation or relocating. 
 A single railroad line might pass by hundreds of landowners, and a 
deal with any one of them will not bind the others.  Suppose that the cost of 
eliminating the sparks is less than the risk-adjusted cost of expected injury 
to the land owners.  In a well functioning Coasean market the parties would 
bargain to a solution in which the railroad eliminated the sparks by some 
means.  If the parties are in a nuisance jurisdiction the outcome is fairly 
simple: no deal will result.  The most the railroad is willing to pay will be 
less than the value the land owners place on being free from the risk 
imposed by the sparks.  The railroad will have to take whichever avoidance 
mechanism is effective and cheapest. 
 But what if the parties are in a no-nuisance jurisdiction.  The land 
owners will have to pay off the railroad.  We can assume that the gross 
amount of the payment is easy to compute because it applies to the railroad 
alone.  For example, if effective spark arresting technology cost $1 million, 
the railroad would accept any amount in excess of that.  But how is the 
payment to be divided up among the, say, 1000 landowners adjoining the 
tracks?  First, they are very likely quite diverse.  Some have grazing land 
adjoining the tracks, making the expected cost of spark-induced fire 
relatively small.  Others may have houses or other buildings close by, and 
for them the expected cost of a fire will be much greater.  Some may have 
100 feet of frontage along the tracks while others have 500, greatly 
increasing their exposure.  Some may be in a direction that is persistently 
upwind while others are downwind.   
 The result will be either underinvestment in efficient technologies or 
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activities, or else a great deal of negotiating and cycling through various 
alternatives.  For example, the land owners may form coalitions whose 
members can be siphoned off by alternative coalitions.  Small owners might 
agree to pay $2000 each, leaving large land owners with $5000.  But then a 
subgroup of the large land owners might reform as a coalition of those 
having houses along the tracks, asking others to join them and offering 
$4000 each. 
 In such a situation Coasean bargaining under a unanimous consent 
rule can turn into endless cycling, with no agreement ever being reached.  
The story is a little like Charles Dickens' Bleak House, where numerous 
potential heirs and devisees contested a will, each asking for more than 
someone else or trying to exclude others until the entire estate was 
consumed by litigation costs.  The parties would have been much better off 
if they had been able to agree, but an agreement would have required 
unanimous consent among all of those with a colorable claim. 
 Each land owner will have a tendency to understate his exposure, 
thus making his share of the payment smaller.  In addition, each landowner 
knows that once the spark arrester is installed it will benefit everyone, so 
they may be able to get away without paying anything at all.
53
  That is to 
say, some many player Coasean markets effectively become markets for 
public goods in the sense that a costly but efficient fix, once installed, 
benefits the entire affected population.  The railroad cannot insist on 
individual payment by selectively denying protection.
54
 
 Coase himself recognized the public goods character of some 
Coasean markets.  In his article on "The Lighthouse in Economics" he noted 
a history in which lighthouses were privately financed with harbor taxes 
charged against ships who came and went.
55
  But Coase never adequately 
addressed the problem of ships that simply passed by, benefitting from the 
lighthouse but not required to pay the tax.  The lighthouses were never 
really private, and to the extent they were they failed.
56
  In any event, the 
harbor tax was assessed by a government agency or its equivalent. 
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 Bargaining problems in many player Coasean markets have 
numerous real world manifestations.  Most obviously is the question 
whether land uses are best allocated legislatively through the zoning system 
or else by private bargaining.  In the first two decades after "The Problem of 
Social Cost" was published, several writers advocated private restrictive 
covenants as efficient alternatives to legislative zoning.
57
  Pairwise 
resolution of disputes among people who have already made their 
investments will always be suboptimal, however, if the investments 
themselves are suboptimal and extraction is costly.  If we want maximizing 
solutions -- the kind where both Sturges and Bridgman can conduct their 
business without costly mistaken investments -- then we must identify the 
problems before the conflict arises. This entails a system more like the one 
for traffic rules, which focuses on the enitre area in which resource conflicts 
arise, on classes of users rather than individuals, and on the overall costs of 
moving resources.  In general, the more costly it is to move a poorly located 
resource (such as a smokestack factor), the greater the value in getting it 
right the first time. 
 Once we decide to allocate land uses over classes rather than 
individuals, however, then the bargaining metaphor becomes no more than 
that -- just a metaphor in which we substitute objective value, usually based 
on market prices or historical costs, for subjective willingness to pay or 
accept.  Zoning and subdivision servitude decisions typically fall into this 
category, involving questions such as how far commercial and 
noncommercial uses should be separated from one another, whether 
polluting or noise producing industry should be segregated, whether to have 
separate professional and industrial parks, and so on.  Assuming we can 
predict correctly or even partially correctly, the costs of making the right 
decisions before investment occurs are almost certain to be significantly 
lower than the costs of fixing things later. 
 An alternative approach that is applied to private land use controls is 
to re-conceptualize the problem of multi-player bargaining as a time series 
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of pairwise contracts.  That is what frequently happens when residential 
subdivisions are initially developed.  The developer draws up a list of land 
use restrictions for a particular subdivision, typically by making an 
economic prediction concerning the uses that will maximize subdivision 
value.  It places these restrictions into the chain of title. The developer then 
sells homes individually, with each buyer agreeing to the restrictions.  Once 
the restrictions are in place and buyers have begun to purchase, acceptance 
of the restrictions is largely mandatory -- take them or leave them.  This 
avoids the problem of dozens or hundreds of home owners having to 
bargain at once.  This “vertical” series of pairwise transactions must 
eventually turn into a “horizontal” arrangement among the home owners, 
who eventually take it over and operate it themselves under contract rules.  
It would be as if Sturges and Bridgman had been obligated before making 
their purchase (or lease) to agree to a covenant restricting the use of noisy 
machinery.  If such a covenant had been in place Bridgman would 
presumably have decided to go elsewhere, where his machinery would not 
interfere with Sturgis' stethoscope. 
 However, this approach would not solve the problem of previously 
created servitudes that no longer serve their social purpose.
58
  We can still 
expect post-agreement hyperstability.  Restrictions remain enforceable even 
after they serve to reduce rather than increase value.  For example, if a 
neighborhood has changed and surrounding areas gone commercial, a 
significant majority may wish to profit by selling off their property for 
commercial use.  But a small number, perhaps those in the interior, want to 
maintain the residential restrictions because they like where they are living 
and the surrounding, similarly restricted homeowners provide a buffer.
59
  In 
many such cases the courts have provided relief, but of course in so doing 
they are imposing a judicial judgment that conflicts with the contract-based 
judgment of the homeowners, and often where there is no obvious injury to 
outsiders.
60
 
In sum, while servitudes create a default rule, changing the default 
requires unanimous consent.  In general, this is a problem with many player 
Coasean markets.  Because the entitlements are alienable resources they can 
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be re-assigned.  If re-assigning them requires unanimous consent, however, 
that promise can be illusory, sort of like a zoning ordinance with no 
provision for variances. 
 It also does not add much to say that efficient outcomes will emerge 
when gainers from a certain rule can compensate the losers, who stand to 
lose less than the gainers gain.  If actual bargains were at issue, the 
recipients would still have to agree with each other about how the 
compensation is to be divided, or the payors would have to agree about how 
the size of each person's obligation.  The same cycling problems re-enter.
61
 
 Some private residential covenant schemes permit landowners to 
amend servitudes by a non-unanimous vote -- often a supermajority such as 
two thirds.  But now we have substituted a legislative, or political market 
for a contract market, and there is no obvious reason why it is not subject to 
all of the difficulties of coalition formation that characterize such markets.  
As a result the courts have frequently had to intervene to protect minority 
rights.  For example, several courts have held that even where a set of 
restrictions permit changes by less-than-unanimous voting, unanimity 
would be required for a proposed change that would affect only a single lot 
in the subdivision.
62
 
 One might be tempted to say that the problem of reaching and 
maintaining efficient outcomes in many player Coasean markets is simply 
one of transaction costs.  These costs may become higher, even 
insurmountable, in markets that have a large numbers of participants and 
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that give rise to the formation of alternative coalitions.  The issue is more 
complex than that, however.  If bargaining were in fact costless it could go 
on forever.  A rational decision maker would continue to bargain as long as 
the expected value of improving one's position exceeded the cost of 
continuing to bargain, which would be zero.  Under zero cost bargaining 
any possibility of an improvement would yield a further offer.  Indeed, in 
such situations it is more likely that positive, although manageable, 
bargaining costs serve to induce equilibrium by making continued 
bargaining costly. 
 
Market Efficiency and the Long Run 
 Using the nuisance case of Sturges v. Bridgman as one illustration, 
Coase's social cost analysis identified the efficient solution as the one where 
the high value activity is preferred while the lower value user's activity is 
shut down or perhaps ameliorated.
63
  This solution is "efficient," however, 
only if we confine our analysis to the “micromarket” involving Sturges and 
Bridgman, which is much smaller than the markets in which these activities 
operate.
64
  Once we look at this broader market for confectioning, 
doctoring, or small business generally, then it may be quite possible to have 
solutions in which both activities can continue without harming one 
another.  In order to do that we would need to consider all of the costs of 
moving resources, not merely those that are involved in transacting.  We 
must also examine the longer run, because an important part of the cost of 
moving resources is correcting for previous mistakes.  In most situations the 
optimal course is to put them into the correct place to begin with. 
 Blum and Kalven were correct in 1964 that pairwise bargaining 
would not work as between two automobiles facing an impending 
collision.
65
  Calabresi responded with a solution that re-focused the 
automobile accident question on the entire market in which such collisions 
are likely to occur.
66
  Because bargaining is possible between neighbors 
with stable relationships and predictible disputes, Coase was able to focus 
on tiny markets that told us a great deal about bargaining but said little 
about optimal allocations of resources in the greater markets in which these 
activities occurred.  The efficient solution to the Sturges v. Bridgman 
problem is to separate their activities sufficiently that both can operate.  But 
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that requires broadening our vision to take into account the entire set of 
market choices that these two people faced before they made their 
investments in a particular location.  That necessarily includes a much 
larger area that encompasses both of their uses, as well as a longer period of 
time.  In the process, we will have involved a much greater number of 
persons in the negotiating process. 
 As between two parties in a resource conflict, the person who places 
the greatest value on a right after interests are in place is not necessarily the 
one would have valued it most highly before they moved in.  For example, 
our hypothetical numbers assumed that Sturges' use of his stethoscope was 
more valuable than Bridgman's use of his mechanical mortar and pestle.  
However, looking ex ante it may also be true that it costs Bridgman much 
more to relocate his bulky machine than it would cost Sturges to relocate his 
lightweight stethoscope.  In addition to assuming that Sturges valued use of 
his stethoscope at £100 while Bridgman valued use of his mortar & pestle at 
£60, suppose that it would cost Sturges only £25 to relocate while it would 
cost Bridgman £40.  In that case a more efficient outcome occurs when 
Sturges moves and both parties continue their operations.  If the jurisdiction 
finds a nuisance, Bridgman will have to pay Sturges to move.  If there is no 
nuisance Sturges must pay his own moving costs.  It's a point that should 
not be lost.  While professionals often have highly valuable occupations, 
they also frequently have highly mobile assets.  The cost of moving a law 
office might be considerably less than the cost of re-locating a cement 
production plant. 
 The most efficient solution to the Sturges/Bridgman problem is to 
allocate property rights in such a way that the problem never arises in the 
first place. Then we can have both confectioners and physicians.  This 
means that the initial position must be one from which further movement is 
least likely to be necessary.  For example, if we can assign Sturges' right to 
a place where he will be free to practice without interference we would have 
the social value of his activity, or £100.  If we can do the same thing with 
Bridgman we will also have the social value of his activity, or £60.  Making 
such decisions, however, almost always requires looking beyond Sturges 
and Bridgman.  While each building has only one actual owner, it may have 
a very large number of potential owners.  One relatively private approach to 
the problem would be a set of servitudes that segregated business activities 
by the amount of interference that they caused.  For example, relatively 
noisy activities such as confectioning could be assigned to one land area, 
while "professional" activities such as practicing medicine could be 
assigned to a different area.  That immediately puts us into territory that 
involves multi-player negotiating, however, and all of the problems 
attending such markets, as discussed supra. 
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 At this point subjective bargaining analogies fail us, but there are 
alternatives.  The Arrovian theory of political markets and endless cycling 
assumed "naked" voter preferences that were noncomparable from one actor 
to another.
67
  But identification of the "cheapest cost avoider" in accident 
law makes no such assumption.  Instead of inferring "preferences," as 
bargaining theory does, it looks directly at the problem of the cost of 
moving resources, typically focusing on engineering costs, health costs, 
productivity, or other factors that can be estimated directly from market 
prices without using individual preference as a surrogate. 
 To be sure, such assignments can interfere with individual liberty in 
ways that many would find offensive. For example, ex ante the market for 
marriage is reasonably competitive, but the market for divorce is a bilateral 
monopoly.  This serves to explain why most divorces are more costly than 
most weddings.  But the long run fix would require the State to intervene in 
the marriage market so as to ensure that only those couples married who 
were likely to stay together. 
 In more purely economic settings the cheapest cost avoider analogy 
works much better, and liberty rights do not need to encompass rights to 
cause harm to others, particularly when the harm occurs outside of a 
property owner's own boundaries.  The State can act to prevent uses likely 
to harm one another from ever coming into too close proximity in the first 
place.  This requires greater use of "objective" welfare judgments, made not 
by assuming hypothetical agreements but rather by looking at the market 
costs and benefits of specific courses of action. 
 
Conclusion 
 We don't usually expect highway drivers to bargain over the right of 
way.  By the time the bargaining relationship is set up, it is too late.  People 
bargain in markets, but the market for optimal rules about rights of way 
does not consist of a single pair of drivers confronting each other at the 
danger point. Rather, it consists of all those driving on a jurisdiction's roads 
who are in a position to have a resource conflict with one another.  The 
"cheapest cost avoider" solution is not a bargaining solution at all, but one 
driven by engineering or safety concerns, or else it is simply a convention 
that must be consistent over a larger number of transactions.  For example, 
driving on the right may not be inherently safer than driving on the left, but 
a uniform rule for either side is certainly safer than permitting drivers to 
negotiate with one another on a pairwise basis as they are approach. 
 Are markets involving more established pairwise relationships any 
different?  Coase thought so, because he accepted previously locked-in 
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commitments as his starting point.  Once Sturges and Bridgman are locked 
into place, a bargaining analogy is helpful because it helps us determine 
which is the least harmful among the alternatives available at that point.  In 
fact, however, a cheaper solution overall may be for one of the parties to 
move, and an even cheaper solution may be an ex ante rule that forbids 
them from locating in close proximity in the first place.  Coase 
underestimated the number of times that the State would have to be 
involved in that choice. 
